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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE ZEESE and EMILY 
ZEESE, his wife, piaintiffs.AppeUantSi 
vs. 
ESTATE OF MAX SIEGEL; DAN 
SIEGEL, EVA SIEGEL, and WESLEY 1 
D. WEBB, a partnership d/b/a Pat- \ Case No. 
ton's Travelers; TRAILER MART, / !3870 
INC., a Nevada corporation, d/b/a 
Dan's Campers N' Trailers; and 
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELA-
WARE, a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet title and unlawful detainer action 
brought by plaintiffs to remove defendant Trailer Mart, 
Inc., from certain premises and for damages in unlawful 
detainer against all defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon defendants' motion at the conclusion of plain-
tiffs' case, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice as 
to all defendants. 
I 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an affirmance of the trial court's 
judgment in all respects. In the alternative, if the case is 
remanded to the lower court, defendants request that this 
Court order further proceedings to determine the lawful-
ness of plaintiffs' notices to quit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts completely disregards 
the trial court's findings and is pervaded with contentious 
conclusions. Defendants are, accordingly, constrained to 
restate the facts in their entirety. 
By a letter dated June 15, 1973 (a carbon copy of 
which was sent to Dan Siegel as President of Trailer Mart, 
Inc.), (Ex. 11-P), Plaintiffs George and Emily Zeese in-
formed Eva Siegel, as Executrix of the estate of Max 
Siegel, that as landlords they elected to terminate a 
"month-to-month" tenancy by which Trailer Mart, Inc., 
a Siegel family corporation, possessed certain real prop-
erty located as 6210 South State Street, Murray, Utah.1 
xThe status of the various parties named in the complaint should be 
explained. Plaintiff George Zeese conveyed his interest in the property 
in question to his wife, Emily, by a warranty deed dated August 14, 1961 
(Ex. 2-P), but his testimony established, and the trial court found, that 
he has always acted as his wife's agent (R. 438; Finding of Fact No. 1, 
R. 64). 
The court found, too, that defendants Eva and Dan Siegel, and 
Wesley D. Webb, are not and never have been a partnership doing bus-
iness as Patton's Travelers (Finding No. 4, R. 65). Rather, "Patton's Trav-
elers" is the assumed name under which Trailer Mart, Inc., is now doing 
business on the property in question (Finding No. 5, R. 65). The d/b/a 
was changed from Dan's Campers N* Trailers to Patton's Travelers in 
January, 1973 (Finding No. 15, R. 66). 
Throughout this brief, unless otherwise indicated, "defendant" will 
mean defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., which the trial court ruled owns the 
leasehold interest in dispute. 
2 
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The letter explained that, "by allowing Trailer Mart, Inc., 
to use the premises as a trailer sales park," restrictive use 
covenants contained in "the expired lease" had been vio-
lated. The letter concludes with notice that summary 
proceedings would be commenced unless the premises were 
vacated by July 18, 1973. 
As will be developed in the paragraphs following, 
this was the first notice that Mrs. Siegel or Dan Siegel 
or any officer or agent of Trailer Mart, Inc., had ever 
received that the corporation's use of the premises was 
thought to violate covenants in the lease. Trailer Mart, 
Inc., had used the premises for recreational vehicle sales 
for four years in reliance on the lease and had assumed 
all the obligations of the lessee defined therein, including 
payment of property taxes and the faithful payment of 
rents. It had also made valuable improvements in the 
property and had informed George Zeese on numerous 
occasions that it believed and acted on the belief that it 
owned a leasehold interest until 1979, with the right to 
exercise options to renew contained in the lease. Mrs. 
Siegel, as Executrix named in the Last Will and Testa-
ment of her deceased husband, had exercised such an op-
tion approximately 46 days after the leasehold interest 
had been acquired by an assignment from defendant 
Husky Oil Company. Not once in the four years and two 
months intervening between the assignment and the notice 
to vacate had the plaintiff landlords questioned the valid-
ity of the exercise of the option or the use of the premises. 
Plaintiff Emily Zeese is the owner in fee of the dis-
puted property (Ex. 2-P). On October 28, 1959, she and 
3 
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plaintiff George Zeese, who then owned an interest in 
the property as a joint tenant with his wife, executed a 
lease agreement with Saturn Oil Company granting Saturn 
a ten-year leasehold interest in the land with options to 
renew for the same period at the expiration of the first 
and two subsequent terms (Ex. 3-P). Saturn Oil erected 
and operated a gasoline station on the premises until 
March 8, 1965, when it assigned the lease to J. L. Terborg 
& Company (Ex. 4-P). J. L. Terborg continued the filling 
station operation until June 1, 1968, when it assigned 
the lease to defendant Husky Oil Company of Delaware 
(Ex. 5-P) which continued the same business until it in 
turn assigned the lease to Max Siegel on May 1, 1969 
(Ex.6-P). 
Max Siegel died on June 3, 1969 (R-358). As soon 
as the lease was assigned to him, however, he caused the 
business operations of a family corporation, Trailer Mart, 
Inc., which had been operating on adjacent property, to 
be expanded onto the Zeese property (R. 544). At this 
time Max Siegel was the President of Trailer Mart (R. 
541), and it is evident that he negotiated the assignment 
in this capacity for the corporation's use and benefit (R. 
531, 544-48), and for the particular use and purpose of 
expanding the camper and recreational vehicle sales bus-
iness from the adjacent property (R. 547). And, while 
the formal assignment from Husky Oil was made to "Max 
Siegel, an individual," Trailer Mart, Inc., took immediate 
possession of the premises and immediately began to dis-
play and sell campers and other recreational vehicles on 
it (R. 549-50). The plaintiffs had prompt notice of this 
assignment and occupancy by a letter from Mr. Siegel's 
4 
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attorneys dated May 8, 1969 (Ex. 7-P) (set out at page 8 
of Brief of Appellants) which makes explicitly clear that 
Trailer Mart, Inc., would be doing business on the prem-
ises as Dan's Campers N ' Trailers. 
Moreover, Mr. Zeese himself testified that he knew 
of the use of the premises by Trailer Mart, Inc., immedi-
ately after May 1, 1969, by his inspection of the premises 
(R.448). 
After Max Siegel's death, his widow, Eva Siegel, by 
letter dated June 16, 1969 (Ex. 8-P), informed the Zeeses 
that as Executrix named in the will of her husband, she 
was exercising the option to renew the lease for another 
ten-year term. Dan Siegel, her son, testified at trial that 
this letter was one of numerous acts intended to *'cover 
a lot of loose ends" remaining after his father's death 
(R. 560). Letters Testamentary had not been issued when 
the option was exercised. 
Plaintiffs base their complaint and this appeal on 
the contentions, essentially, (1) that Trailer Mart's use 
of the premises violates use covenants in the lease, and 
(2) that the option to renew was never validly exercised. 
The evidence is clear that the corporation has used the 
premises for camper and recreational vehicle sales since 
early May, 1969, and that the option was exercised in 
mid-June, 1969. One might then have expected the drama 
of this lawsuit to begin unfolding in the fall of that year, 
or, perhaps, with a reasonable allowance for time to sur-
vey the situation and test positions, in the winter of 1970. 
5 
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In fact, no objection to the use of the premises or 
the exercise of the option was heard by any of the de-
fendants (R. 476, 556-557) until June, 1973, when Eva 
Siegel received the notice to vacate the premises. Mr. 
Geldzahler's letter of May 8, 1969, concerning the use of 
the premises went unanswered (R. 474, 556-557). Mrs. 
Siegel's letter of June 16, 1969, exercising the option, re-
ceived no reply (R. 476, 557). Mr. Zeese visited the prem-
ises and observed the Trailer Mart business activities at 
various times after he received these letters (R. 448, 
486-487). A reasonable inference must be that he ob-
served the improvements on the premises, including the 
paving of its surface and the erection of signs advertising 
the business (R. 561 ).2 Mr. Zeese knew also that, as a 
result of his urging, Trailer Mart had the property sur-
veyed and a fence erected along its south boundary, and 
that Trailer Mart, Inc., paid for both the survey and the 
fence (R. 486-487). In short, it was manifestly clear to 
Mr. Zeese, a businessman of no mean talents himself,3 
that Trailer Mart was operating a substantial business 
on the premises, with all of the long-term planning and 
commitments such a business implies (R. 558). 
2Dan Siegel testified to other improvements which Mr. Zeese could 
have noticed: 
"Q. 71? 72. Were there any other improvements made on the 
property? 
A. We remodeled the little gas station house so it could be used 
as an office. We refurbished and repainted the billboard signs so 
that they would — would reflect some advertising for the camper 
lot. It was about a cost of around five hundred dollars as I recall 
and we repainted the main sign downstairs." 
3Mr. Zeese represented himself to be the business agent of his wife, 
and both he and Dan Siegel testified to the extensive negotiations he con-
ducted concerning the sale of the property. He was also active in the 
activities directed at developing the disputed property and the property 
around it. (R. 453, 455, 484). 
6 
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Mr. Zeese knew also that Dan Siegel believed he 
controlled a valid, enforceable lease on the premises (R. 
484, 492). From 1971 through 1973, in a series of buy-
sell negotiations, Dan Siegel listened to Mr. Zeese's of-
fers to sell and made offers to buy the premises, together 
with the larger parcel of which it formed a part (R. 
557-559). Mr. Siegel made an offer to buy based on an 
appraisal that discounted the value of Mrs. Zeese's estate 
in fee by the value of the leasehold interest (R. 512). This 
appraisal and valuation were discussed between them 
(R. 512). The record also indicates that on numerous 
other occasions Mr. Siegel informed Mr. Zeese of his 
belief that the value of the lease must be considered in 
arriving at a price (R. 492). At no time did Mr. Zeese 
contradict Mr. Siegel's directly stated position that he 
controlled a valid, enforceable lease in the premises (R. 
553,475). 
At trial, plaintiff Zeese explained his reasons for 
waiting to disabuse Mr. Siegel of his position concern-
ing the lease: 
"Q. During these negotiations over the sale of 
the property in 1972, you didn't tell Mr. Siegel 
that there was — that you thought that the lease 
was invalid, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. During the negotiations in 1973, I assume 
the same is true that you didn't tell Mr. Siegel 
that you thought he had an invalid lease? 
A. I didn't tell him that. I want him to stay 
there month-to-month until I be ready to tell him 
to get out. 
7 
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Q. So — but you didn't tell him that? 
A. I didn't tell him that. I didn't want — he 
was playing his game and I was playing mine. 
Try to tell him to get out when I will be ready. 
Q. So that you were going to wait until your 
own convenience in order to ask — in order to 
declare the lease void, is that correct? 
A. That's right." (R. 484-485) 
He also explained why Mrs. Siegel's letter exercising the 
option went unanswered: 
"Q. Now, upon receipt of that document you did 
understand that to mean that it was an exercise 
of the option on the property to extend the term 
another ten years? 
A. I understand they want to exercise the op-
tion but I refuse because they be — Max Siegel 
Estate been violating that lease all the time. 
Q, Well, tell me how you refused, Mr. Zeese. 
A. How I refuse? 
Q. Yes. How did you refuse upon — after re-
ceipt of this letter, did you contact the author — 
authoress of that letter, Eva Siegel, and tell her 
you refused to accept it? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you contact Dan Siegel? 
A. I didn't contact anybody because I didn't have 
to. 
Q. Now, so that upon receipt of this option, 
what you did is just simply didn't do anything? 
A. That's right. 
8 
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Q. Did it occur to you at that time that those 
people might have thought they had exercised an 
option? 
A. There was no lease to exercise an option. 
Q. But you hadn't prior to that told them that 
there was no lease? 
A. I didn't have to tell them because they are 
not fools. They know themselves they were not 
having — not getting the lease." (R. 476) 
In short, plaintiffs' position from May, 1969, was 
that the lease had been breached when the filling station 
operations were terminated and Trailer Mart, Inc., be-
gan selling campers on the premises (R. 448). From that 
time on, Mr. Zeese testified, he considered that Trailer 
Mart, Inc., held the premises pursuant to a month-to-
month tenancy: 
"Q. Now, you considered then that there had 
been a breach of the lease on May 1 when the lease 
was assigned for use as a trailer park — trailer 
park — trailer sales lot? 
A. I told you that I didn't tell them anything 
because I had my plan. They thought they have 
a lease. They try to sell that to me to convince 
me that they have a lease but I know very well 
and they know themselves they didn't have no 
lease. They violate that lease several times. 
Q. Now, between May 1 of 1969 and June of 
1973 when this notice — I believe it was June 16th 
of 1973 when you caused Mr. Theodore to send 
a notice to quit. At that time during that four 
years did you contact Dan Siegel and tell him that 
he couldn't sell trailers or that it was in violation 
of the lease on those premises? 
A. No, I didn't. I didn't have to. 
9 
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Q. Did you contact Eva Siegel? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you contact Wes Webb? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you contact anyone at all? 
A. No." (R. 475) 
Nor did it ever matter to him, once he formed the opinion 
the lease was breached, who occupied the premises: 
"Q. Now, upon receipt of that letter in May, 
1969, to the best of your recollection, Mr. Zeese, 
didn't you think then that Trailer Mart, Inc., was 
going to be then selling trailers on your property? 
A. If they do that they know they violate the 
lease. They can do as they please, but I didn't 
know that, no. I know that they was on Jensen's 
property selling that. 
Q. But you did know that trailer sales were be-
ing conducted on the property around the first 
part of May? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that and then you receive a letter 
on May 8, 1969, that indicates that Max Siegel and 
Trailer Mart, Inc., are going to be doing business 
or as it says: 'Moreover, both Mr. Siegel and 
Trailer Mart, Inc., have committed themselves to 
a significant advertising program based upon the 
thus expanded sales facilities.' Now, did that sug-
gest to you that Trailer Mart, Inc., would be do-
ing business on your property? 
A. I don't care who was doing business there. 
I know they didn't have no lease and I don't care." 
(R. 473-474) 
10 
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In July, 1973, Mr. Zeese caused 15 day notices to 
quit to be served upon Eva Siegel, as the Executrix of 
Siegel's estate, upon Trailer Mart, Inc., and upon defend-
ant Husky Oil Company.4 No one at Trailer Mart nor 
any member of the Siegel family had ever been previously 
informed that the premises were, in Mr. Zeeze's opin-
ion, held only month to month. 
The trial court found that defendant Trailer Mart, 
Inc., which plaintiff Zeese testified he had always be-
lieved to be a month-to-month tenant, had paid the real 
property taxes on the premises as follows: 
"Finding of Fact No. 21. Defendant Trailer Mart, 
Inc., d / b / a Dan's Campers N ' Trailers paid all 
real property taxes assessed on the property 
through the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972, to 
Salt Lake County in the amounts of $687.53, 
$683.42, $1,686.22, and $1,622.09, respectively. 
Pursuant to an order of this Court, defendant 
Trailer Mart, Inc., has deposited a check in the 
amount of $1,330.44 with the clerk of the court 
for the real property taxes assessed for the year 
1973." (R. 67) 
Mr. Zeese testified that neither he nor his wife paid the 
taxes, that he knew the taxes had been, but he did not 
know who paid them. (R. 494) 
The trial court found further that after Mr. Geld-
zahler's letter of May 8, 1969, stating that substantial 
commitments had been and would be incurred in reliance 
on the lease, and after Mrs. Siegel's letter stating that 
4The three "partners" of the non-existent partnership, Patton's Trav-
elers, were also served. 
n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the option to renew was thereby exercised, plaintiffs re-
ceived and cashed checks for rent payment as follows: 
"Findings of Fact No. 18. Commencing on May 
16, 1969, and continuing through December 15, 
1972, defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a Dan's 
Campers 'N Trailers, sent monthly rental checks 
in the sum of $200 each to plaintiffs, all of which 
were cashed by plaintiffs in the ordinary course 
of business; commencing on January 5, 1973, and 
continuing through June 12, 1973, defendant 
Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a Patton's Travelers, sent 
monthly rental checks in the sum of $200 each to 
plaintiffs, all of which were cashed by plaintiff 
George Zeese in the ordinary course of business.'' 
(R. 66-67) 
The trial court also found that defendant, in reliance 
on the lease, had made the following improvements on 
the property: 
"Findings of Fact No. 29. In reliance upon the 
lease and its validity and the validity of the exer-
cise of the option to renew, defendant Trailer 
Mart, Inc., performed the following acts: 
A. On or about August 6, 1969, defendant 
Trailer Mart, Inc. purchased from Husky Oil Com-
pany of Delaware all of Husky Oil Company's 
building, equipment, and other personal property 
owned by Husky and located upon the premises. 
B. In or around May and June of 1969 and 
at various times thereafter, defendant Trailer Mart, 
Inc., d / b / a Dan's Campers 'N Trailers and later 
Patton's Travelers, purchased and caused to be 
erected on the premises certain signs to advertise 
and identify its business thereon. 
C. Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a 
Dan's Campers 'N Trailers, arranged and paid for 
the grading and paving of certain portions of the 
surface of the premises. 
12 
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D. Pursuant to plaintiff George Zeese's in-
struction and request, defendant Trailer Mart, 
Inc. caused the property to be surveyed and erected 
a fence to define a boundary thereof and to secure 
it from the encroachment of an adjacent property 
owner. Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc. arranged and 
paid for both the survey of the property and the 
fence erected/ '(R. 68-69) 
The trial court did not agree with Mr. Zeese's con-
clusion concerning the use provisions in the lease: 
"Conclusion of Law No. 1. Defendant Trailer 
Mart, Inc.'s use of the premises for the purpose 
of camper and other recreational vehicle display 
and sale does not violate the use provisions con-
tained in the lease." (R. 69) 
The trial court concluded also that Mr. Zeese could 
not conceal his belief that the lease had been breached 
by the use of the premises, ignore the subsequent notice 
exercising the option, accept each and every rent payment 
after such notice, remain silent in the face of repeated 
statements that the defendants considered the lease to 
be valid, stand silently by while defendants paid $4,679.26 
in property taxes, watch but say nothing while defendants 
improved the premises at its expense and even solicit cer-
tain improvements, and then, four years and two months 
later, when at last it suited his purposes, inform the de-
fendants that they were only month-to-month tenants 
and order them off the premises within fifteen days: 
"Conclusion of Law No. 6. Plaintiffs have waived 
and are estopped from asserting defects, if any 
there may have been, in the exercise of the option 
to renew the lease. 
13 
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Conclusion of Law No. 7. Plaintiffs have waived 
and are estopped from asserting violations, if any 
there may have been, of the use covenants con-
tained in the lease by defendant Trailer Mart, Inc." 
(R.70) 
The trial court concluded too that plaintiffs were 
estopped from asserting and had waived any claims against 
defendant Husky Oil arising from its assignment of the 
lease. Any liability against Husky must, in any event, 
be based on breaches by the Siegel defendants. The trial 
court found that there were none. (R. 70) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSION THAT 
DEFENDANT TRAILER MART, INC.'S USE 
OF THE PREMISES FOR ITS BUSINESS DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE USE PROVISIONS CON-
TAINED IN THE LEASE IS CLEARLY COR-
RECT. 
Throughout the Brief of Appellant, plaintiffs assume 
there is no question but that Trailer Mart, Inc.'s business 
on the premises violates use provisions in the lease. This 
assumption flies in the face of the trial court's first con-
clusion of law: 
"Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc's use of the prem-
ises for the purpose of camper and other recrea-
tional vehicle display and sale does not violate 
the use provisions contained in the lease."5 
5Because both parties argued this question to the trial court (R. 
589-591, 594-496), plaintiffs' consistent refusal to recognize this conclu-
sion in their brief, which corresponds to Mr. Zeese's insistent testimony 
that use covenants were violated, is difficult to explain. 
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The particular use covenant in question reads as 
follows: 
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all of the same unto 
Lessee, subject to the conditions herein contained, 
and for no other purpose or business than that of 
the construction, installation, maintenance and op-
eration of the necessary buildings, structures, 
driveways, approaches, tanks, pumps, signs, light-
ing equipment, or appliances for the operating 
upon said premises the business of storing, mar-
keting and distributing petroleum products and 
commodities marketed in connection therewith, 
AND for the operation of a gasoline and oil filling 
service station, a truckers lodge, and restaurant, 
AND for the dealing in generally of such goods, 
wares and merchandise as are customarily dis-
played, purchased and sold at the establishments 
of the type herein referred to, OR any other lawful 
business." (Ex. 3-P, page 1) (Emphasis added). 
It is, of course, a generally recognized rule of construc-
tion that leases, as any other contract, are to be construed 
so as to save and harmonize all the words and phrases 
in them.6 In this case, plaintiffs' assumption that de-
fendants use of the premises violated this covenant must 
ignore the phrase "any other lawful business." 
Applying ordinary rules of grammar and punctua-
tion to this covenant may, it is true, yield three slightly 
different grammatical meanings from the phrase, but any 
one of the three would encompass defendant's business 
as among the "other lawful businesses" allowed. 
The first would consider the phrase "or any other 
lawful business" as coordinate with the phrase "for no 
*See, e.g., Powerine Co. v. Russell's Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906, 
913 (1943). 
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other purpose or business than that of . . ." The cove-
nant as a whole could then be summarized as follows: 
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD . . . for no other 
purpose or business than that of . . . [a filling 
station or restaurant} . . . or any other lawful bus-
iness/' 
A second possibility, perhaps the most plausible, is 
that the phrase "or any other lawful business" is coordi-
nate with each phrase following the words "than that of." 
The conjunctions in small capitals as the provision is 
set out above at 15 make the sense of this construction 
clear. 
Finally, the phrase could be coordinate with the 
words "establishments of this type," and the covenant 
summarized as follows: 
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD . . . for no other 
purpose or business than . . . [a filling station or 
restaurant} . . . and for the dealing in generally 
of such goods . . . as are customarily displayed, 
purchased and sold at the establishments of the 
type herein referred to, or any other lawful bus-
iness." 
Defendants are not suggesting that this Court must 
choose one of these three possible constructions, but 
elaborate the grammatical possibilities to illustrate the 
correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the use 
of the premises for recreational vehicle display and sale 
does not violate this covenant. Whatever sense is made 
of the phrase "any other lawful business" in the context 
of the entire sentence, its own sense, any lawful business, 
remains intact. The covenant as a whole then has the 
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meaning, in essence, that the premises are leased for the 
primary purpose of a gas station operation, but for any 
lawful business in any event. The phrase "for no other 
purpose or business," if it is construed as having any 
relationship to the "lawful business" phrase, must be 
allowed the paraphrase of "for no other than a law Jul 
purpose or business." 
Any one of the possible constructions offered above 
would, in short, save all of the words and phrases in 
the covenant and would harmonize all the words and 
phrases with each other. Nothing would be subtracted 
from the covenant and nothing added. It would mean 
exactly what it says. 
The trial court's ruling with respect to the use cove-
nant comports not only with the words of the lease it-
self, but also with generally accepted rules for the con-
struction of use restrictions in leases. Cases are collected 
in an Annotation, "Provision in Lease as to Purpose for 
which Premises Are To Be Used, As Excluding Use for 
Other Purpose," 148 A.L.R. 583 (1944), where the gen-
eral rule is stated: 
"Provisions which authorize the use of leased 
premises for a specific purpose or which merely 
give consent to a particular use of the property, 
are generally regarded as permissive rather than 
restrictive in nature, and therefore, in the absence 
of other limiting language, the lessee is not re-
stricted to the use specified in the lease, (cases 
cited.]" 148 A.L.R. at 585-86. 
In Turman v. Safeway Stores, 317 P.2d 302 (Mont. 1957), 
the rule is stated as follows: 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The rule is that lessee is entitled to use the prem-
ises for any lawful or valid purpose, without in-
terference on the part of the landlord, so long 
as such use is not forbidden by express provision 
of the lease or by some necessarily implied con-
struction thereof, and does not amount to waste 
or destruction of the property." 317 P.2d at 306. 
(emphasis supplied). 
Although the use covenant under consideration in 
the Turman case is not set out specifically, it is apparent 
from the opinion that it comprised a particular descrip-
tion of a retail store without any general clause such as 
"for any other lawful business." The Montana court 
ruled that the defendant's subletting of a part of the 
premises for garage purposes did not violate this use 
restriction. Such reasoning would be even more compel-
ling here, where the specific uses described are followed 
by the generally permissive phrase "or for any other 
lawful business." 
The "express provision" or "limiting language" re-
quired to restrict use to specifically stated purposes are 
illustrated in many cases collected in the A.L.R. annota-
tion cited above. For example, in Northern Vac. Ry. Co. 
v. Northern Reo Co., 250 N.W. 329 (N.D. 1933), the re-
strictive clause specified for warehouse purposes "and 
no other." In Britt v. Luce, 114 S.W.2d 267 (Tex App. 
1938), the use clause stated explicitly: "for filling station, 
general store and living quarters and for no other pur-
pose." No such express provision is present in the lease 
in question; in fact, the generally permissive words "any 
other lawful business" are written where such specifi-
cally restrictive language would usually be found. 
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Several cases in the A.L.R. annotation also illustrate 
the restrictions arising from "necessarily implied construc-
tions" of the lease. In Weil v. Adams, 53 App. Div. 313, 
66 N.Y.S. 244 (1900), for example, the court ruled that 
a provision in a lease requiring consent to changes in a 
sign upon which the use of a building was announced 
to the public implied necessarily that consent was re-
quired to a varying use. An interesting example of nec-
essarily implied restrictions is found in Eggen v. Wetter-
horg, 257 P.2d 970 (Ore. 1951). There the use language 
provided for the erection and operation of a gasoline 
filling station and the rent provisions specified that the 
landlord would receive as rent, in addition to a flat 
monthly sum, one-half cent for each gallon of gasoline 
sold. The Oregon court determined that the erection of 
a cafe and beer tavern on the premises did not violate 
the use provisions, since such a restriction was not im-
plied in the lease, but that the termination of the filling 
station operation did violate use provisions, since the 
landlord's rent was necessarily tied to the operation of 
the station and the termination of its operations would 
deprive him of a substantial portion of the considera-
tion he had given for the lease. Plaintiffs-appellants have 
nowhere argued that such necessarily implied restrictions 
are present in the lease in question, and an examination 
of it reveals none. 
Plaintiffs properly argued to the trial court that the 
lease must be construed in its entirety, Potverine Co. v. 
Russell's Inc., supra. However, the other provisions that 
plaintiffs indicated should be brought to bear on the use 
covenant are of no value in construing it. The first of 
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these provisions states that the lessee "may also sublet 
the premises for the operation of a gasoline and oil fill-
ing station to any person or persons without the consent 
of the lessor . . ." (emphasis supplied). The "also" re-
fers to the immediately preceding sentence: "This lease 
shall be assignable by the LESSEE without the consent 
of the LESSOR provided that LESSEE shall at all times 
be liable for the faithful performance of all covenants 
of this lease. . . ." The juxtaposition of these two sen-
tences emphasizes the absence of further use restrictions 
in the assignment provisions. Accordingly, the plain 
meaning of the assignment clause is that an assignee takes 
the lease subject only to the restrictions contained in the 
use covenant set out above. Defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., 
never argued that it held the premises as a sublessee, but 
rather as an assignee.7 
Plaintiffs also pointed to a paragraph on page 5 of 
the lease which provides that the lessee may cancel if 
certain permits and other arrangements necessary for the 
erection of a filling station could not be obtained. No 
defendant has ever argued that Saturn Oil did not in-
tend to erect and did not in fact erect a gas and oil fill-
ing station on the premises, nor that the premises were 
not used for these purposes for almost ten years. The 
provisions going to cancellation concern only the imme-
diate use contemplated by the original lessee, but imply 
nothing at all about the meaning of the use provisions.8 
defendants did plead, in the alternative, in their counterclaim, that 
they were a sublessee, but maintained consistently at trial that Trailer 
Mart, Inc., possessed the premises as an assignee. 
8The drafter would have been particularly concerned that the pur-
poses for which his client, Saturn Oil, was leasing the premises were cov-
ered and protected by the use provisions. It would be only common legal 
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Both of these provisions leave only the use provision to 
be construed, with no guidance as to its meaning. 
Plaintiffs also argued to the trial court that the phrase 
must be limited by the concept of ejusdem generis. This 
argument is implausible for many reasons. Ejusdem gen-
eris is not applicable ipso facto whenever a general phrase 
concludes a series of particular phrases. As was stated 
in City of Lexington v. Edgerton, 159 S.W.2d 1015, 
1017-18, 289 Ky. 815: 
"The (ejusdem generis' and fexpressio unius est 
exclusio alterius' rules are 'rules of construction', 
and not 'rules of substantive law', and are not to 
be applied if the intention of the act is clear." 
Similar statements that the rule of ejusdem generis is to 
be applied to determine the intent of the parties are to 
be found in Phillips v. Houston Nat91 Bank, Tex., 108 
F.2d 934, 936 (1940), and, with respect to the intent 
of the legislature in constitutional and statutory construc-
tion, in Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 
Utah 14, 93 P. 53, 54(1907). 
At the trial, plaintiffs offered no evidence or argu-
ments that the intent of the parties was not contained 
within the four corners of the lease itself. They had al-
leged in their complaint that the use covenant was ne-
gotiated for a particular purpose, but apparently later 
abondoned this position. And, while Mr. Zeese made 
clear his certainty that the premises should be used only 
sense to elaborate these uses in some detail, leaving unspecified the other 
lawful businesses for which the premises might be used, since these were 
not within the realm of immediate contemplation. Cf., Annot. 2 A.L.R.2d 
1150. 
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for service station purposes, his behavior during defend-
ant Trailer Mart's first four years and two months of 
business on the premises indicates that he had no par-
ticular reason for insisting on such use and did not feel 
himself harmed by Trailer Mart's business activities. Had 
the service station operation been related to some partic-
ular interest of Mr. Zeese, he certainly would have ob-
jected immediately when the camper and recreational ve-
hicle sales commenced and would have announced his 
objections as soon as he felt himself harmed. In fact, it 
was not until Mr. Zeese determined that another bar-
gain for the use of the land would be more beneficial to 
him than the bargain already struck that he announced 
that the use covenant had been violated. 
From this, it would strain credulity to believe that 
Mr. Zeese had any particular purpose or intent when he 
agreed to the use covenant in the lease. The intention 
of the parties was not, therefore, before the trial court, 
and the rule of ejusdem generis is not applicable. 
Even if intention had been an issue, it is clear that 
Mr. Zeese's course of conduct during the four years and 
two months in question would have been much more pro-
bative of his understanding and intentions with respect 
to the use provision than would the application of a latin 
phrase to the words of the lease. Cf., Vernon v. Lake 
Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302, 306 (1971); 
Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 323, 266 
P.2d 494 (1954). And, if there had been any real inten-
tion to express the restrictions for which the plaintiffs 
argue, a more inappropriate use provision is difficult to 
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imagine. The plaintiffs would have insisted on words 
other than "for any other lawful purpose". 
To summarize, the trial court was not faced with 
the problem of determining the intent of the parties; it 
was faced with the plain meaning of the lease itself and 
properly considered the lease in the light of generally 
accepted rules for construction of use provisions. Its con-
clusion that Trailer Mart does not and has not violated 
the use provision was clearly correct. 
POINT II 
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES MAY BE IN-
VOKED TO ESTOP A LANDLORD FROM 
ASSERTING VIOLATIONS OF USE COVE-
NANTS AS A BASIS FOR FORFEITURE, OR 
TO ESTABLISH THAT A LANDLORD HAS 
WAIVED ANY FORFEITURE ARISING 
FROM SUCH COVENANTS. 
Plaintiffs argue in Points IV and V of the Brief of 
Appellants, that the trial court erred in concluding that 
they are estopped from asserting and have waived vio-
lations of the use covenant in the lease. The force of this 
argument is diminished when it is remembered that the 
trial court had previously concluded that these was no 
violation of the use covenant. The conclusion concern-
ing waiver and estoppel was in the subjunctive — qual-
ified by the words "if any there may have been". Plain-
tiffs ignore, or perhaps are unaware of, the first conclu-
sion. They take all of their shots at the second. Even 
these are wide of the mark. 
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Defendants have no argument with the general rules 
set out at page 48 of the Brief of Appellants as general 
rules. These general rules do not, however, apply to 
this case. The plaintiffs did not comply with the words 
they quote from 3A Thompson on Real Property, § 1328, 
at 578 (1959 Repl.), which states the common law rule: 
"Yet, even after an estoppel, if the covenantee 
gives notice that he intends henceforth to stand 
upon his legal right, it has been held that he may 
enforce the terms of the contract strictly from that 
time on" (emphasis supplied). 
Nor do the lease provisions before this Court comport 
with the lease provisions Thompson considers in the 
language quoted by plaintif s: 
"Any inference of a waiver by the landlord of a 
forfeiture of the lease by acceptance of the rent 
with knowledge of a breach of condition or cove-
nant is rebutted by a provision in the lease that 
the receipt of rent with knowledge of any breach 
shall not be deemed a waiver" (emphasis supplied). 
These rules should be contrasted with the lease provision 
and the plaintiffs' conduct in this case. The lease provides: 
"No waiver of any forfeiture by acceptance of rent 
or otherwise shall waive any subsequent breach of 
any conditions in this lease;" (emphasis supplied). 
The meaning of this provision is that acceptance of rent 
or other conduct may constitute a waiver of forfeiture, 
but that such waiver shall not constitute a waiver of for-
feiture for subsequent breaches. It is, in short, a state-
ment of the common law rule. Thompson, on the other 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hand, considers provisions stating that acceptance of rent 
will not constitute a waiver of a forfeiture based on any 
breach, prior or subsequent. 
If, then, for argument's sake, we join plaintiffs in 
ignoring the trial court's conclusion that the use provi-
sion was not violated, plaintiffs are still in the position 
of those covenantees who, after an estoppel, must give 
notice that they intend henceforth to stand upon their 
legal rights and strictly enforce the terms of the lease. 
Mr. Zeese's conduct, which has been set forth at some 
length above and which is amply supported by his own 
testimony, certainly constitutes grounds for an estoppel 
from asserting, or a waiver of, any forfeiture based on 
breaches of the lease. The trial court so found. 
Plaintiffs were in no position then to demand that 
defendants vacate the premises nor to bring an action 
for unlawful detainer, without first giving defendant 
notice to cure the purported breach. But both the June 
notice and the notice to quit were pre-emtory: defend-
ant was ordered off the premises. Nothing was stated in 
either of them that would indicate that plaintiffs in-
tended to stand by any provision in the lease and to en-
force them in the future. 
There can be no question, and plaintiffs do not seri-
ously argue, that a landlord can waive and be estopped 
from asserting breaches that would otherwise give them 
the right to declare forfeiture and to re-enter. See 3A 
on Real Property, § 1328, at 575, 579 and 581 (1959 
Repl.). In Sharp v. Twin Lakes Corp., 283 P.2d 611 
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(Nev. 1955), the lessor, asserting numerous breaches in-
cluding breaches "dealing largely with the manner in 
which the premises were maintained and used" admitted 
that the rent payments due under the lease had been ac-
cepted with knowledge of the defaults. The lessor had, 
"until filing of his counterclaim, given the lessee no inti-
mation that he regarded the lease as forfeited." The 
Nevada Court ruled: 
"His [the landlord's} conduct was consistent only 
with an election to hold the lessee to its obliga-
tions under the lease. Clearly, he has, by accept-
ance of rentals under these circumstances, affirmed 
the existence of the lease and recognized the lessee 
as his tenant. His right to claim forfeiture has 
thus been waived" (emphasis supplied). 283 P.2d 
at 613. 
See also, Cady v. Slingerland, 514 P.2d 1147 (Wyo. 1973); 
Larsen v. Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177, 183 (Wyo. 1951); Port 
of Walla Walla v. Sun-Glo Producers, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 
51,504P.2d324,330(1973).9 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CON-
CLUDED THAT PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED AC-
TUAL NOTICE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE 
OPTION TO RENEW, THAT ANY DEFECTS 
IN THE NOTICE DID NOT PREJUDICE 
PLAINTIFFS, AND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
HAVE WAIVED AND ARE ESTOPPED FROM 
ASSERTING ANY SUCH DEFECTS. 
defendant's counsel at trial reserved objections to the propriety of 
plaintiffs' notices to quit. If the judgment of the trial court is vacated, 
the case should be remanded for further proceedings, since defendants 
never had an opportunity to present their defenses. The record is in no 
condition to support the relief plaintiffs seek on this appeal. 
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A. There Was No Defect in the Notice Exercising 
the Option. 
In construing Utah Code Annotated § 73-3-19, this 
Court has stated that the powers of an executor named 
in a will are closely limited before Letters Testamentary 
are issued. Estate Realty, Inc. v. Kershaw, 29 Utah 2d 
92, 505 P.2d 777 (1973). The Estate Realty case involved 
a plaintiff realtor's attempt to obtain judgment for a 
commission on a sale of real property in an estate, which 
was purportedly consummated before the executor was 
issued Letters Testamentary. The Court ruled that the 
sale was not in fact consummated because the executor 
had no power to dispose of the property. It is signifi-
cant, however, that the buyer did obtain and take pos-
session of the property on the terms bargained for be-
tween him and the executor. Neither the buyer nor the 
executor were before the Court attempting to upset the 
bargain, which was, as the opinion states, later ratified 
by each of the parties to the contract. Rather, the realtor, 
which must in its professional capacity be charged with 
some responsibility to handle real estate transactions in 
a fashion that cannot be impeached by Utah statutes, did 
not receive a judgment for its commission. It is not clear 
from the Estate Realty case that either the seller-executor 
or the buyer would have been allowed to upset the trans-
action, even before it was confirmed by the probate 
court, if the other party had changed its position sub-
stantially in reliance on the contract. 
In the Estate Realty case, this Court rejected the doc-
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trine of "relation back"10 with respect to the sale of real 
property before an executor is issued Letters Testamen-
tary. However, § 73-3-19, Utah Code Annotated, states 
specifically that an executor may "take necessary meas-
ures for the preservation of the estate". Clearly, the pres-
ervation of the lease in question was an act that was 
necessary for the preservation of the estate, for without 
the exercise of the option, a valuable lease might have 
been lost. 
In the Estate Realty case, there was apparently no 
attempt to show that the sale of the property was for any 
particular benefit of the estate, let alone that it was 
done to preserve the estate's assets. 
Mrs. Siegel was granted Letters Testamentary shortly 
after the letter exercising the option to renew was writ-
ten. Contrary to the implications in plaintiffs' brief, there 
is nothing in the probate code requiring a petition to the 
probate court for permission to exercise an option to 
renew a lease.11 
In any event, this may not be an appropriate case 
for the determination of whether the relation back doc-
10The relation back rule is stated in an Annotation in 2 A.L.R.3d 
1107 (1965): 
"[I]t is well settled that the grant of letters testamentary or of ad-
ministration relates back to the decedent's death to validate previous 
intermediate acts of one who subsequently qualifies as executor or 
administrator when such acts are for the benefit of the estate as when 
necessary to preserve its assets" (emphasis added). 
11
 Plaintiffs' brief contains scandalous material implying that the 
State and Federal fiscs do not contain their proper share of Mr. Max 
Siegel's estate. Aside from their standing to raise these issues, the probate 
has long been closed, and the taxes assessed and paid. Moreover Max 
Siegel was the agent of Trailer Mart, Inc., as the trial court found, in 
receiving the assignment from Husky Oil Company. 
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trine should be applied to acts by an executor without 
Letters Testamentary which were meant to preserve assets 
in an estate. The trial court concluded that the notice 
of the exercise of the option by Mrs. Siegel did not vio-
late any terms or conditions of the lease. It was in writ-
ing, and it was timely. Plaintiffs knew at that time that 
defendant Trailer Mart, Inc., d / b / a Dan's Campers N ' 
Trailers was in possession of the premises. They subse-
quently had repeated actual notice that the defendants 
believed the option had been validly exercised and that 
the lease was valid and enforceable. Plaintiffs accepted 
monthly rent from defendant for a period of four years 
and two months, allowed the defendant to pay substan-
tial property taxes on the premises, and remained silent 
as defendants improved the property. 
B. The Trial Court's Conclusion That the Option 
Was Exercised Would Have Been Correct Even If There 
Had Been No Written Notice. 
Even if there had been no written notice of an exer-
cise of the option, the record contains ample evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion and judgment that 
Trailer Mart, Inc., owns a leasehold interest pursuant 
to the terms of the lease. 
The rule is stated in 50 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and 
Tenant, § 1190: 
* 'Generally, where a lessee having a general priv-
ilege of extending the lease holds over, even with-
out any notice of the lessor of its election to ex-
tend the lease for the further term, his holding 
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over constitutes an election so to extend, and he 
is entitled, as against the lessor, to hold for a fur-
ther term." 
In the same section it is indicated that holding over cre-
ates a * 'presumption of an exercise of the option" which 
may be rebutted by the landlord. In this case, plain-
tiffs neither introduced, offered nor suggested any evi-
dence that would constitute a rebuttal to this presumption. 
It is specifically stated in 50 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord 
and Tenant, § 1191, at 79, that 
"If the tenant has an option to renew for a speci-
fied term, the holdover, with payment and uncon-
ditional acceptance of rent, will create a tenancy 
for the specified term, such acceptance of the rent 
constituting a waiver of any right of the land-
lord's notice of the intention of the tenant to re-
new." 
Cases from neighboring jurisdictions are in agree-
ment with this rule. For example, in Drace v. Hyde, 497 
P.2d 420 (Okla. 1972), it was held that where a lessee, 
by serving written notice could renew its lease for an-
other five year term with an increment in rent from $280 
per month to $300 per month, and the lessee never gave 
any written notice that the option to renew was exer-
cised, but did on the landlord's demand increase the rent 
payments to $300 per month and paid the increased rents 
for a period of 31 months after the expiration of the first 
term, the lease was thereby renewed for the entire five 
year term. In another Oklahoma case, Standard Parts 
Co. v. D & J Invest. Co., 288 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1955), the 
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Court quoted with approval the following language from 
51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 77 at 628: 
1
'Where a lease provides that a tenant may at 
his option have an extension for a specified time 
after the expiration of the term of the lease . . . 
the mere holding over after the expiration of the 
specified time is generally held to constitute an 
election to hold for the additional or extended 
term, particularly where coupled with the pay-
ment and acceptance, or tender, of the rent fixed 
in the option.'' 
The Court then ruled that because the defendant tenant 
had made valuable improvements on the property and 
had held over under the terms of the lease, the option 
was deemed to be exercised without any specific acts ex-
ercising it12 And in Cafe Apollo Co. v. Anselm, 111 P.2d 
691 (Cal. App. 1941), the court, after determining that 
the sublessee defendant in fact had an option to renew, 
stated: 
"It is admitted that appellant remained in pos-
session and paid the stipulated rental of $275 per 
month for nearly two years after the expiration 
of her sublease. Such payment of rental and its 
acceptance by respondent constituted an exercise 
of such option by appellant. As a result, the trial 
court's finding to the effect that appellant, ever 
since April 1, 1936, has used and occupied, and 
does now use and occupy said floor space, 'as such 
month-to-month tenant', is not supported by the 
evidence." 117 P.2d at 695-94. 
12The lease in the Standard Parts case did not contain explicit pro-
visions as to how or when the option would be exercised. 
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In this case, defendants held over for a period of 
four years and two months without once receiving any 
intimation from plaintiffs that the option to renew the 
lease had not been validly exercised. Not only did they 
pay the rents and the property taxes and improve the 
premises, but they also gave plaintiffs actual and ex-
plicit notice that they considered the lease to be valid 
and enforceable. The trial court's conclusions and judg-
ment comported with the well established rule that by 
holding over and continuing to perform all of the ob-
ligations of the lease, an option for an additional term 
is thereby exercised. Even if plaintiffs had received no 
written notice of any sort of an exercise of the option to 
renew, they would still be without grounds to claim that 
the lease was not renewed for the additional term. 
C. Plaintiffs Waived and Were Estopped from As-
serting Defects in the Notice. 
But, of course, plaintiffs did receive a written notice 
that conformed in all respects with the requirements 
stated in the lease. It is well established that in circum-
stances such as those in this case, the landlord waives 
and is estopped from asserting any defects in the notice. 
In Jensen v. O.K. Invest. Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 
P.2d 713 (1973), where the landlord had accepted rents 
and remained silent in the face of written notification 
that an option to renew was being exercised by the as-
signee, this Court ruled that such conduct by the land-
lord 
". . . constituted a waiver of [the landlord's} right 
to demand a forfeiture for breach of the condition 
against assignment without written consent." 507 
P.2dat717 
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Conduct that would compel a finding of waiver of an 
affirmative act, such as giving a written consent to an 
assignment, would be even more compelling as a waiver 
of defects in the act of another, such as giving notice that 
an option to renew was being exercised. 
Many courts have held that a landlord may waive 
and be estopped from asserting strict compliance with 
the conditions stated in a lease by which an option to 
renew shall be exercised. In Flint v. Mincoff, 353 P.2d 
340 (Mont. I960), the Court, quoting 51 C.J.S., Land-
lord and Tenant, § 62 (d), stated: 
"The provisions of the lease requiring notice from 
the lessee of an election or intention to renew or 
extend the term are for the benefit of the lessor, 
and therefore the notice itself or any other matter 
going to the sufficiency thereof may be waived. 
The requirements of written notice may be waived 
by parol and a waiver of notice may be expressed 
or may be inferred from the conduct of the parties." 
(emphasis added) 
In the Flint case, the lessee had wired his landlord $1,000 
for the payment of the next year's rent without any writ-
ten notice that the lease was to be renewed for the addi-
tional years as required by the lease agreement. The jury 
found that, as alleged by the tenant, the landlord had 
been orally notified of the tenant's intention to renew and 
accepted such notification without objection, thereby waiv-
ing his right to require strict compliance with the notice 
conditions specified in the lease. 
Similarly, in Pouquette v. Double L-W Ranch, Inc., 
464 P.2d 350 (Ariz. App. 1970), the tenant had given notice 
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two weeks prior to the time called for in the lease, which 
could properly have been given at any time within the 
next two months. The landlord continued to accept the 
rents and made no objection to the purported exercise of 
the option until his action was commenced. The trial 
court found that the landlord was not prejudiced by the 
premature notice. Under these circumstances, the appel-
late court held that the landlord had waived his right to 
insist on compliance with the terms for renewal contained 
in the lease. See also, Wherry v. Lacey, 388 P.2d 279 (Ore. 
1964). In the case at bar, plaintiffs are not prejudiced 
to them from the manner in which the option to renew 
the lease was exercised. In fact, Mr. Zeese stated explic-
itly that it suited his purposes very well to have defend-
ant on the premises for a period of four years and two 
months. 
To summarize, in the case at hand, actual notice was 
given that the option to renew the lease for an additional 
term was being exercised. The uncontroverted facts es-
tablish that the plaintiffs made no objection at all to this 
notice at any time and, in fact, the plaintiffs assumed that 
the notice was immaterial because the lease agreement 
itself had already been terminated by defendant's use of 
the premises. Plaintiffs continued to accept the rents as 
provided in the lease agreement for a period of four years 
and two months without once indicating to defendant 
that they considered the option to renew had not been 
exercised. Plaintiffs could have been prejudiced by the 
exercise of the option by Mrs. Eva Siegel rather than 
Trailer Mart, Inc., and plaintiffs' actions in remaining 
silent and failing to object to the exercise, accepting the 
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rents, accepting defendant's payment of the taxes, all show 
that they did not consider themselves prejudiced. As in 
the cases cited above, through their silence and failure 
to object and continued acceptance of rents (all of which 
in this case continued for a much longer period than in 
any other case defendants can discover) plaintiffs have 
waived any right to object to the sufficiency of notice. 
The trial court's conclusions and judgment are sup-
ported both by well established rules of waiver and estop-
pel, and the rule that a tenant holding over and comply-
ing with all of the terms of the lease shall be considered 
to have exercised the option to renew for an additional 
term, even though there were defects in compliance with, 
or a complete failure to comply with, the conditions in 
the lease for exercising such an option. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT THAT 
TRAILER MART, INC., OWNS A VALID 
AND SUBSISTING LEASEHOLD INTEREST 
IN THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE 
TERMS OF THE LEASE IS CLEARLY COR-
RECT. 
In the Brief of Appellants, plaintiffs labor strenu-
ously to establish that the trial court erred in its conclu-
sion and judgment that Trailer Mart, Inc., owns a lease-
hold interest in the premises pursuant to the terms of 
the lease. However, this conclusion and judgment is amply 
supported in the record and by the law. 
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A. The Trial Court Properly Found That an As-
signment From Max Siegel to Trailer Mart, Inc., Had 
Been Established by the Corporation's Use and Possession 
of the Premises. 
In Jensen v. O.K. Invest. Corp., supra, this Court 
stated: 
* 'There is a presumption that a lease has been as-
signed, when there is a person other than the les-
see in possession of the leased premises, who is 
paying rent to the lessor." 507 P.2d at 716. 
The Court cited Abbott v. Bob's U-Drive, 222 Ore. 
127, 352 P.2d 598, 81 A.L.R.2d 793 (I960), where the 
Oregon Court stated: 
"When a person other than the lessee is in pos-
session of leased premises paying rent to the les-
sor, there is a presumption that the lease has been 
assigned to the person in possession, [citations} 
In a majority of the modern cases applying this 
rule, the implied assignment arising out of pos-
session is regarded as effective to form the basis 
for the running of covenants in the lease so as to 
burden or benefit the assignee." 352 P.2d at 602. 
Disapproving of a prior Oregon case, Leadbetter v. Pew-
therer, 61 Ore. 168, 121 P. 799 (1912), which stated that 
assignment by occupancy "cannot amount to or be shown 
to establish a formal assignment, for the purpose of bind-
ing defendant by the covenants of the lease", the Abbott 
opinion continued: 
"The Court, in the Leadbetter case, held that the 
possessor was liable for the rent covenanted to be 
paid in the written lease. Apparently, the recovery 
was deemed to be for use and occupation rather 
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than for the breach of a covenant running with 
the land. We believe, however, that the cases 
holding that the implied assignment carries with 
it liability on the covenants which run with the 
land state the better rule, and we adopt it. . . . If 
the possessor's interest is regarded as arising out 
of an implied assignment, // seems only consistent 
to treat him as standing in the same position as 
an assignee who occupies the premises under a 
written assignment. The occupation of the prem-
ises and the payment of rent should be sufficient 
to take the case out of the statute of frauds." 352 
P.2d at 602-03 (Emphasis supplied). 
This Court also cited 3A Thompson on Real Property, 
§ 1208 (1959 Repl.), where the rule of assignment by oc-
cupancy is stated as follows: 
' 'Where a person other than the lessee is found 
in possession of the leased premises, having suc-
ceeded to the lessee's enjoyment and occupation, 
without the prior knowledge of the landlord, such 
person is presumed to hold, by virtue of an as-
signment from the lessee {footnote, citing cases}. 
Where lessee occupies the leased premises during 
the continuation of the term and pays rent, he is 
prima facie an assignee of the term." 
At page 46 of the same section, Thompson explains 
how the presumption of assignment by occupancy may be 
rebutted: 
"The presumption of a valid lease may be re-
butted by showing that the occupant of the prem-
ises held as an undertenant without even a bare 
knowledge of the original lease. . . . The presump-
tion of an assignment can also be overthrown by 
showing that the occupant never told the lessors 
that he was holding under the lease." 
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The uncontroverted facts in this case meet every ele-
ment of the presumption of assignment by occupancy. 
Trailer Mart, Inc., was in possession, and the plaintiffs 
knew it was in possession. It paid the rent directly to 
them for a period of four years and two months. Plain-
tiffs completely failed, and indeed did not even attempt 
to rebut the presumption of assignment by occupancy. 
It is clear in the record that Trailer Mart, Inc., had full 
knowledge of the original lease and told the plaintiffs-
lessors that it was holding under the lease. It is not 
really necessary, then, to follow plaintiffs' tortuous ar-
guments that Max Siegel was not an agent of Trailer 
Mart, Inc., and that various other errors compel the re-
versal of the trial court's judgment that Trailer Mart, 
Inc., owns the leasehold interest. It acquired the interest 
by an assignment through occupancy. Nevertheless, the 
Court's attention is invited to the other infirmities in 
plaintiffs' arguments that the lease never reached Trailer 
Mart, Inc. 
B. The Trial Court's Conclusion That Max Siegel 
Acted as an Agent of Trailer Mart, Inc., Was Clearly Cor-
rect. 
Plaintiffs attack Max Siegel's status as an agent of 
Trailer Mart, Inc., on several grounds. First, they con-
tend at pages 15 through 17 of their brief that the assign-
ment from defendant Husky Oil Company (Exhibit 6-P) 
indicates clearly on its face that it was made to Max Siegel 
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as an individual. In the Jensen case,13 supra, this Court 
quoted the following language with approval: 
"The contract of the agent is the contract of the 
principal, and he may sue or be sued thereon, 
though not named therein, and notwithstanding 
the rule of law that an agreement reduced to writ-
ing may not be contradicted or varied by parol. 
It is well settled that the principal may show that 
the agent who made the contract in his own name 
was acting for him. This proof does not contra-
dict the writing; it only explains the transaction." 
The Court also quoted with approval the statement that 
the foregoing "declares the universal law". Sumner v. 
Flowers, 130 Cal. App. 2d 672, 279 P.2d 772, 774 (1955). 
In view of this rule and Mr. Zeese's knowledge obtained 
immediately after the assignment that Trailer Mart, Inc., 
was occupying the premises, the words on the face of 
the assignment itself do not establish that Max Siegel was 
not acting as an agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. The fact 
that he was is well established in the record at 544 
through 548, where it is explained that it was always 
Max Siegel's intention as president of Trailer Mart, Inc., 
to obtain the premises in question for the expansion of 
the corporation's business onto it, and that he negotiated 
the assignment for this purpose (R. 544-548). A cursory 
reading of Dan Siegel's testimony contained in these 
pages will demonstrate the distortions contained at page 
17 of the Brief of Appellants. 
13The circumstances of the assignment in this case are indistinguish-
able from the circumstances in Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp., 29 Utah 
2d 231, 507 P.2d 713, 715-16 (1973). Here, as there, the assignment was 
made to the agent whose agency was not disclosed on the face of the 
document. 
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Plaintiffs next attack the agency relationship under 
the Utah statute of fraud and attempt to distinguish the 
rule stated in Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 52, 261 
P.2d 952 (1953), that "when the person who acts under 
oral authorization is either a general agent or executive 
officer of the corporation", there is an exception to the 
general rule of the statute of frauds that the agent's 
power to enter the particular transaction must be author-
ized in writing. In the Mathis opinion, this Court cited 
with approval the following language from Jeppi v. 
Brockman Holding Co., 34 Cal.2d 11, 206 P.2d 847, 850, 
9 A.L.R.2d 1297: 
"In the case of an executive officer of a corpora-
tion an exception from the requirement of writ-
ten authority finds at least plausible support and 
reason in that, as said in the McCartney case, 'the 
executive officer of a corporation is something 
more than an agent. He is a representative of the 
corporation itself.' * * * This reasoning squares 
with sound principles and the necessities of mod-
ern business." 206 P.2d at 850. 
The Mathis opinion continued: 
"Kingston [the agent} not only acted as Trustee 
for the cooperative interest in the property, but he 
also held the positions of general manager and 
president. Moreover, the scope of authority au-
thorized and performed was that of a general agent. 
The exception to the language in statute of frauds 
is clearly applicable here." 
In the instant case, the question of whether Trailer Mart, 
Inc.'s corporate minute book was in order was never 
raised at the trial. In the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, it must be assumed that it was, and that Max 
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Siegel was duly authorized to act as President by a writ-
ten resolution of the board. Therefore, since he did have 
the powers of a corporate president and the consequent 
powers of a general agent, this exception to the statute 
of frauds would be applicable just as it was in the Mathts 
case. 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Mathts case by 
reading it to say that the agent there in question was 
"orally" given the requisite authority and that this "oral" 
authorization was evidenced by the minutes of a cor-
porate meeting. Such corporate proceedings would be 
very odd. In fact, the Mathts opinion makes clear that 
it was the agent's general position as trustee that was 
evidenced by the corporate minutes.14 
Finally, plaintiffs would have defendant bound by 
its pleadings in the alternative on its counterclaim that 
are set forth at pages 21 and 22 of plaintiffs' brief and 
by certain quotations from an opening statement and a 
colloquy between the Court and defendant's counsel. It 
can only be said that pleadings in the alternative do not 
bind a party to the position pled, otherwise the rule al-
lowing such pleadings would be reduced to an absurdity. 
Defendants reassert the correctness of the argument in 
the opening statement and the colloquy. The lease was 
assigned; it was assigned by defendant Trailer Mart, Inc.'s 
occupancy of the premises. In addition, and for the sec-
ond of the two theories that defendants' counsel asserted, 
14For a discussion of the policy and cases supporting the rule that an 
assignment by occupancy does not violate the statute of frauds see 
Abbott v. Bob's U-Drive, supra, 352 P.2d at 603. 
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Mr. Max Siegel was acting as an agent of Trailer Mart, 
Inc., when the assignment was received. Both theories 
are supported by the record and by the law, and both 
theories are sufficient to support the trial court's judg-
ment that the leasehold interest is owned by Trailer Mart, 
Inc. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DIS-
MISSED ALL CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF AC-
TION AGAINST DEFENDANT HUSKY OIL 
COMPANY. 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware is a defendant in 
this case because it assigned the lease. Plaintiffs claim 
no defects or failure to comply with the conditions of 
the lease in this assignment, and the record establishes 
that plaintiffs received prompt notice of it. 
Plaintiffs' attack on the trial court's judgment with 
respect to Husky Oil Company is again based upon a 
fundamental misapprehension of what the trial court 
found and concluded. In addition to concluding that 
plaintiffs had waived and were estopped from asserting 
any causes of action against Husky Oil, the trial court 
made another dispositive general conclusion: that plain-
tiffs had failed to show any liability on the part of the 
Siegel defendants. Once again, contrary to plaintiffs' 
statement in Point VI of their brief, the district court did 
not find that Trailer Mart, Inc., "breached the restrictive 
use covenants contained in the lease". Its conclusion was 
directly opposite. Accordingly, by plaintiffs' own theory 
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of the case, since they failed to show any liability on the 
part of Trailer Mart, they have failed to establish any 
liability against defendant Husky Oil Company. 
But even if the Court decides that the trial court's 
conclusions with respect to Trailer Mart were erroneous, 
plaintiffs' claims against defendant Husky Oil Company 
must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs would have the best of all possible legal 
arguments. On the one hand, they claim that the Siegel 
defendants immediately breached use covenants contained 
in the lease and failed to properly exercise an option to 
renew its term, thereby becoming month-to-month ten-
ants, subject to eviction on 15 days notice. For these de-
fendants, plaintiffs argue, the lease was a nullity almost 
from the date of its assignment, and they have no rights 
under its terms and provisions, but were allowed to stay 
on the premises for four years and two months as month-
to-month tenants. On the other hand, plaintiffs argue 
that with respect to defendant Husky Oil Company, the 
lease remained in full force and effect for a period of 
four years and two months, even though the option to 
renew was never properly exercised, the original term 
had expired four years previously, and the use covenants 
were violated. 
Plaintiffs never explain how, if the lease lapsed as 
asserted in their letter of June 15, 1973, and defendant 
Trailer Mart, Inc., was allowed to remain on the prem-
ises only as a month-to-month tenant, its terms could re-
main valid and enforceable with respect to defendant 
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Husky Oil Company. The proposition is so unusual that 
it is difficult to find legal concepts to bring to bear on it. 
Plaintiffs point to the Siegel defendants and say, "Your 
contractual rights and obligations under the lease are at 
an end, and our relationship will henceforth be that of 
a landlord to a month-to-month tenant." They then point 
to Husky Oil and say, "You are duty-bound to see that 
the Siegel defendants fully and faithfully comply with the 
obligations of the lease." 
Plaintiffs suggest that the words of Rule 8(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bar the trial court's con-
clusion that plaintiffs had waived and are estopped from 
asserting any defects in the assignment from Husky Oil 
to Trailer Mart, Inc. This rule is not as stringent as 
plaintiffs would have it. In Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 
2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, this Court allowed the introduction 
of a subsequent agreement, even though it had not been 
pled as an affirmative defense, when the plaintiffs did 
not make any representations to the Court that they were 
surprised or prejudiced by its introduction. Clearly in 
this case plaintiffs were on notice that waiver and estop-
pel would be an issue before the trial court since it was 
pled and argued at length in the pretrial proceedings by 
the Siegel defendants. At trial plaintiffs made no attempt 
that is apparent in the record to rebut these defenses. 
Moreover, since the conclusion of waiver and estoppel 
with respect to the Husky Oil assignment was premised 
completely on the relationship between plaintiffs and the 
Siegel defendants, Husky Oil could not be apprised of 
the underlying facts until the proceedings were well be-
yond the original and amended complaint and answers. 
44 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It would have been superfluous and redundant to com-
pel Husky Oil to amend its answer to include these de-
fenses when it was clear that the matter would be fully 
determined by the ruling on the Siegel defendants' de-
fenses. Cf., Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 
884(1955). 
Even if plaintiffs abandoned their anomalous posi-
tion that the lease had lapsed with respect to the Siegel 
defendants but not with respect to Husky Oil Company, 
Husky would still not be liable for any breaches on the 
part of Trailer Mart, Inc. It must be remembered that 
Husky was itself an assignee, not the original lessee spe-
cified in the paragraph in the lease upon which plaintiffs 
rely. As is said in Walbergh v. Moudy, 329 P.2d 377, 
381 (Cal.App. 1958): 
"The assignment of a lease creates a privity of 
estate from the original lessor and the assignee 
on the acceptance by the latter of the assignment. 
No contractual relation comes into existence be-
tween them by the mere force of the assign-
ment. . . . In the absence of a new contractual 
stipulation, there is no privity of contract between 
the assignee and the lessor. An assignee who holds 
the demised property merely by virtue of an as-
signment of the lease, without any contractual re-
lation with the lessor to fulfill the covenants of 
the lease, is bound only for obligations arising 
from actual possession or privity of estate as dis-
tinguished from privity of contract." 
In the instant case, since the plaintiffs offered no evi-
dence of any contractual relationship between themselves 
and Husky Oil Company, it is clear that Husky's rights 
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and duties pursuant to the lease arose from its possession 
or privity of estate and were immediately terminated 
when it relinquished possession. See also, Bornel, Inc. v. 
City Products Corp., 432 P.2d 489 (Wyo. 1967); Cf. 
49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 439 at 443: 
"[I}f the lessee parts with his estate by assigning 
the lease to another . . . the privity of the estate 
is thereby destroyed and he has no further obliga-
tion to pay rent." 
In short, plaintiffs' claims against defendant Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware are completely untenable and 
should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The rulings and judgment of the trial court were cor-
rect in all respects and should be affirmed for the reasons 
hereinabove set forth. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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